Federalist papers 10

This shall accordingly constitute the subject of my next address. PUBLIUS. 1. The same idea, tracing the arguments to their consequences, is held out in several of the late publications against the new Constitution.The competitions of commerce would be another fruitful source of contention.When the sovereign happened to be a man of vigorous and warlike temper and of superior abilities, he would acquire a personal weight and influence, which answered, for the time, the purpose of a more regular authority.

It is true that several of the States, separately, are encumbered with considerable debts, which are an excrescence of the late war.According to this distribution, each confederacy would comprise an extent of territory larger than that of the kingdom of Great Britain.There is sufficient diversity in the state of property, in the genius, manners, and habits of the people of the different parts of the Union, to occasion a material diversity of disposition in their representatives towards the different ranks and conditions in society.The Same Subject Continued: The Powers Conferred by the Constitution Further Considered For the Independent Journal.A tolerable expertness in military movements is a business that requires time and practice.Federalist 10 is part of commonwealth winner essay a remarkable public discussion, spawned by the ratification debates, between Federalists and Antifederalists on the.It may in the last place be observed that the supposed danger of judiciary encroachments on the legislative authority, which has been upon many occasions reiterated, is in reality a phantom.But we find, in fact, that the antagonists of the proposed Constitution, so far from acquiescing in their justness or truth, seem to make their principal and most zealous effort against this part of the plan.All that remains, within this branch of our inquiries, is to take notice of an objection that may be drawn from the great extent of country which the Union embraces.

The number of which this branch of the legislature is to consist, at the outset of the government, will be sixty five.Minos, we learn, was the primitive founder of the government of Crete, as Zaleucus was of that of the Locrians.In any other sense the proposition has either no meaning, or an absurd one.The Same Subject Continued: The Union as a Safeguard Against Domestic Faction and Insurrection From the New York Packet.We have now completed a survey of the structure and powers of the executive department, which, I have endeavored to show, combines, as far as republican principles will admit, all the requisites to energy.The more southern States furnish in greater abundance certain kinds of naval stores--tar, pitch, and turpentine.It may be a reflection on human nature, that such devices should be necessary to control the abuses of government.

From a body which had even a partial agency in passing bad laws, we could rarely expect a disposition to temper and moderate them in the application.For it cannot be presumed that the same degree of sound policy, prudence, and foresight would uniformly be observed by each of these confederacies for a long succession of years.This, it has been urged, ought to have depended upon the assent of one, or both, of the branches of the legislative body.

It is necessary also to recollect here the observations which were applied to the case of biennial elections.But not only fewer just causes of war will be given by the national government, but it will also be more in their power to accommodate and settle them amicably.Without a guaranty the assistance to be derived from the Union in repelling those domestic dangers which may sometimes threaten the existence of the State constitutions, must be renounced.Should such emergencies at any time happen under the national government, there could be no remedy but force.If it be said that the legislative body are themselves the constitutional judges of their own powers, and that the construction they put upon them is conclusive upon the other departments, it may be answered, that this cannot be the natural presumption, where it is not to be collected from any particular provisions in the Constitution.The more powerful members, instead of being kept in awe and subordination, tyrannized successively over all the rest.The reverse of this results from the constitution of human nature.

That separation had another consequence, which merits attention.But however little this objection may be countenanced, even by precedents among ourselves, it may be satisfactory to take a nearer view of its intrinsic merits.And it would have precisely the same effect against the enterprises of ambitious rulers in the national councils.Who shall settle the terms of peace, and in case of disputes what umpire shall decide between them and compel acquiescence.But with all these abatements, the business of federal legislation must continue so far to exceed, both in novelty and difficulty, the legislative business of a single State, as to justify the longer period of service assigned to those who are to transact it.Have we valuable territories and important posts in the possession of a foreign power which, by express stipulations, ought long since to have been surrendered.The principle of representation, in one branch of the legislature at least, was established in all of them.

The Senate, which is a branch of the legislative department, is also a judicial tribunal for the trial of impeachments.The judiciary and the executive members were left dependent on the legislative for their subsistence in office, and some of them for their continuance in it.Suppose an article had been introduced into the Constitution, empowering the United States to regulate the elections for the particular States, would any man have hesitated to condemn it, both as an unwarrantable transposition of power, and as a premeditated engine for the destruction of the State governments.In order to cast an odium upon the power of calling forth the militia to execute the laws of the Union, it has been remarked that there is nowhere any provision in the proposed Constitution for calling out the POSSE COMITATUS, to assist the magistrate in the execution of his duty, whence it has been inferred, that military force was intended to be his only auxiliary.It will be no alleviation, that these powers will be exercised by a plurality of hands, and not by a single one.

And it ought to have the same operation in regard to some cases between citizens of the same State.Would not similar jealousies arise, and be in like manner cherished.By NECESSITATING a change of men, in the first office of the nation, it would necessitate a mutability of measures.

Men of factious tempers, of local prejudices, or of sinister designs, may, by intrigue, by corruption, or by other means, first obtain the suffrages, and then betray the interests, of the people.Author: Alexander Hamilton or James Madison To the People of the State of New York: IT MAY be contended, perhaps, that instead of OCCASIONAL appeals to the people, which are liable to the objections urged against them, PERIODICAL appeals are the proper and adequate means of PREVENTING AND CORRECTING INFRACTIONS OF THE CONSTITUTION.The members of the executive and judiciary departments are few in number, and can be personally known to a small part only of the people.